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In this paper the focus is on the strategy formulation processes, specifically supportive methods and 
structures, which address various managerial issues concerning discontinuous technologies and radical 
innovation in the early phase of strategic decision-making. In three in-depth case studies how companies 
proceeded with discontinuous technology and radical innovation ideas in strategy formulation was 
investigated ex-post. Based on literature and the analysis from the cases nine propositions are suggested 
for the design of an idealized strategy formulation process model for the simultaneous and differentiated 
strategic management of radical innovation and incremental innovation. The propositions are transformed 
into a visualized process model showing the interaction and arrangement of the latter. 
 
 
Keywords: discontinuous technology, radical innovation, strategic planning 
1  Introduction 
An innovation is said to be radical, if it involves the application of significant new technologies or 
significant new combinations of technologies to new market opportunities (Tushman & Nadler, 1986). 
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Radical innovation “departs dramatically from the norm” (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) and “transforms 
the relationship between customer and suppliers, restructures marketplace economics, displaces current 
products, and often creates entirely new product categories” (Leifer, McDermott, O'Connor, Peters, Rice, 
& Veryzer, 2000). Radical innovation breaks with the continuity of existing technological paradigms and 
sets the stage for new technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982). 
 
The approach to deliberately break with continuity was originally discovered by Schumpeter (1934) and 
described in his theory of innovation and economic development in which “creative destruction” is the 
driver of change. Radical innovations allow companies to take the leading position in market entry, to 
initiate and shape the structure of the industry and the new rules of competition.   
 
Coping with radical innovation is not only an advantage in overcoming accelerated technology change, it 
also responds to the increasing pressure for long-term growth. A recent study conducted in Germany 
showed that the average profitability from radical innovation projects was at 14.7% compared to an 
average of only 6.9% generated from incremental innovation projects (Berth, 2003). These findings 
support what Song and Montoya (1998) found in their study that examined 163 radical new products and 
169 incremental products. 
 
Coping with radical innovation is a difficult task for companies, especially for established ones 
(Christensen, 1997; Leifer, McDermott, O'Connor, Peters, Rice, & Veryzer, 2000; Stoelhorst, 2002). From 
a technology management view this task often falls to the management of discontinuous technologies right 
at its initial appearance in the early stage of an innovation.  Discontinuous technologies are the result of 
totally new scientific insights that conclude with existing technology paradigms (Dosi, 1982). Breaking 
with existing technology paradigms can result in a mature industry in radical product innovation (Lambe 4 
& Spekman, 1997). Some scholars also refer this early stage as the fuzzy front end of innovation
7. Several 
studies indicate that firms are mastering this fuzzy front end when technological innovation is incremental, 
however they achieve only a poor rate of success once a technology turns out to be discontinuous 
(Christensen, 1997). Nevertheless most companies still manage discontinuous technologies and radical 
innovation in the same way they manage continuously evolving technology and incremental innovation 
(Rice, O'Connor, Peter, & Morone, 1998; Veryzer, 1998a; McDermott & O'Connor, 2002) – they do not 
seem to be aware of the major differences in the character between the two (Colarelli O'Connor, 1998).   
Poor insight into the management of discontinuous technologies and radical innovations represent a strong 
threat to companies as rapid, complex and technological-driven change is becoming an increasingly 
disruptive force in today's markets, business, economics, and society. The convergence of different 
technologies that emerge more quickly is accelerating this trend (Canton, 2003). 
 
1.1  Aim and structure of this paper 
It is intended that through this paper a contribution will be made to a better understanding of this threat to 
strategic technology management in established companies. The use of the term strategic mangement is 
meant to describe the process of formulating a technology-oriented strategy. The term strategy 
formulation refers to the extensive research conducted by Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) in the field of 
general management. In the present paper the design and planning school are also referred to. Here, a 
process known as the strategy implementation process designs the implementation of strategy.. Following 
this course of research a set of propositions as guidelines for the development of a strategy formulation 
process including supporting methods and structures are elaborated. The basis for propositions is 
successively deduced in the course of the paper. The paper is organized in 7 chapters. After this first 
chapter introducing the subject, the second chapter reviews current literature showing the common 
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understanding of characteristics and challenges of managing discontinuous technologies and radical 
innovations. Furthermore we present existing approaches of strategy formulation processes designed for 
discontinuous technologies and radical innovation. The third chapter describes the in-depth investigations 
conducted in three cases of industry projects dealing with discontinuous technologies and radical 
innovations. The fourth chapter describes the findings derived from the cross case comparison of these 
cases. Based on insight from literature and the case studies, the propositions are elaborated in the fifth 
chapter, with in the sixth chapter a process concept reflecting the latter. The seventh chapter closes the 
paper with a summery and a conclusion. 
 
Our concept is based on the idea of a systematic and coordinated management approach to simultaneously 
design and commercialize both incremental and radical innovations – the latter based on discontinuously 
evolving technologies. In doing so the aim is to improve the reliability of this process identifying radical 
innovation opportunities so as to increase the number of radical ideas successfully realised and 
commercialized. In the meantime the process enables incremental innovation ideas to be handled in order 
to secure daily business.  
 
 
2  Research on discontinuous technology and radical innovation 
Research conducted in the field of discontinuous technologies and radical innovation can generally be 
grouped into two clusters. The first cluster concentrates its research on an industry level. This research 
analyses the influence of radical innovations within a whole industry. The second cluster is based on a 
company level and analyses projects that handle discontinuous technologies and radical innovation. 
Despite this different focus of research, both clusters agree on the major characteristics and challenges of 
discontinuous technologies and radical innovation. Thus firstly the common understanding of these 
research clusters is presented before the differences in their findings are explained.  6 
2.1  The common understanding between industry and company focused research 
There is a broad agreement among researchers that usually the emergence of discontinuous technologies 
and radical innovation is treated with a low sense of urgency (Rafii & Kampas, 2002) as research and 
development of these technologies takes a lot of time. Generally such projects last for up to ten years and 
more (Rice, O'Connor, Peter, & Morone, 1998). They usually require a lot of resources and attention 
(McDermott & O'Connor, 2002) before they can eventually be transferred into marketable products. From 
basic research via development to the first stages of commercialisation these endeavours are accompanied 
by high uncertainty or risk (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Rice, O'Connor, Peter, & Morone, 1998; 
Veryzer, 1998a). Such uncertainty is of multiple dimensions (Milliken, 1990; Leifer, 2000). For instance 
such uncertainty is due to a lack of technological and market knowledge as no previous technological or 
reliable market insights exist in the company (Christensen, 1997). Market data is seldom available and 
customer requirements are often vague
8 (Song & Montoya-Weiss, 1998; Veryzer, 1998). This uncertainty 
makes an evaluation of radical innovation projects very difficult. In addition the existing organisation as 
well as resource uncertainties complicate the implementation of radical innovation projects. In sum these 
uncertainties coupled with high assignment of resources makes discontinuous technology and radical 
innovation projects very risky. This is why many organizations are reluctant to engage in such projects 
(McDermott & O'Connor, 2002) and rather tend to further develop their competencies within a relatively 
narrow scope and range (McKelvey, 1996) focussing on short term revenues. Thus once a discontinuous 
technology is ready for the market, it is often commercialised by outsider companies instead of established 
industry leaders (Utterback, 1994; Strebel, 1995; Christensen, 1997).  
 
In general there is broad agreement between scholars that discontinuous technologies and radical 
innovations have a very specific character and are distinct from continuously evolving technologies and 
incremental innovation (Lynn, Morone, & Paulson, 1996; O'Connor, 1998; Rice, O'Connor, Peter, & 
Morone, 1998; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). This distinction of technologies and innovations ask for 
                                                 
8  Herstatt & Lettl  (2004) found a case where customers were successfully involved in the development of radical 
innovation products. 7 
different styles of management including differentiated types of strategic actions and organisational 
capabilities (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). Thus conventional management techniques are not suitable 
until the technological innovation has reached a certain maturity level so that it can fit the pattern of 
incremental innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Rice, O'Connor, Peter, & Morone, 1998; Veryzer, 
1998a; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999; Leifer, McDermott, O'Connor, Peters, Rice, & Veryzer, 2000a). 
Authors (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; McDermott & O'Connor, 2002) agree 
that sustainable growth requires specific management skills for both types of innovation (incremental vs. 
radical) at the same time. Thus Tushman and Anderson claim (1986) that companies have to overcome the 
dilemma to master “evolutionary and revolutionary change” simultaneously. Tushman and O’Reilly 
(1998) emphasize that on the one hand companies have to plan and align their activities along a  relatively 
stable and evolutionary change. On the other hand they have to eliminate these achievements once the 
competitive environment changes radically knowing that new ones will substitute the foundations 
underlying their present products. 
 
These understandings that reflect the very different nature of radical versus incremental innovation 
represent the initial positions for both research clusters, mentioned earlier in this paper. Both clusters 
acknowledge that the inherent uncertainty and risk of radical innovation needs a distinguished 
management from the one used for incremental innovation. However important this distinction is scholars 
agree that the dilemma lies in the necessity for the simultaneous management of both types of innovation 
as sustainable innovation is the combination of changes initiated by radical innovation followed by 
continuous incremental improvement innovation.  
 
Taking this common understanding as a base the next two subchapters show the different findings of the 
two clusters of research mentioned earlier. 8 
2.2  Industry focused research 
Research focused on industry level analysis builds on these understandings and describes the changes that 
happen within a given industry structure. Scholars have collected empirical data over long periods of time 
and within specific industries. They describe patterns that emerge whenever a discontinuous technology or 
radical innovation occurs. The benefit of this research is that it helps to better understand and describe the 
phenomenon of discontinuous technology change. A number of descriptive models have emerged that 
describe the mechanisms of discontinuous technology change and radical innovation. One of these models 
is the technology S-Curve, which visualizes technology performance that evolves continuously with 
cumulating R&D expenditures along an S-shape curve (Foster, 1986). This model assumes that every 
technology has a certain performance level that cannot be exceeded. The S-curve is discontinued when a 
radical innovation appears that is based on a new technology with the potential to exceed performance of 
the old technology
9. This new technology is said to be discontinuous compared to the old one. Another 
industry model is the technology lifecycle model
10. It is based on the observation that over the time a 
technology runs through different development stages similar to the product life cycle model. According 
to experience, the technologies’ competitive capacity declines progressively through its lifecycle. While 
the progression through the lifecycle is driven by incremental innovation, the emergence of a new 
technological lifecycle will be generated by a radical innovation. A third example is the industry lifecycle 
model, which originated from the observation that structures and competition within many industries are 
influenced to a great extent by the technological paradigms applied in it (Utterback, 1994). Thus a 
discontinuous change of a specific technology, even initiated by a single company, can have a 
considerable effect on the whole of the industry (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The observed pattern is 
that a radical innovation enlivens the innovation rate in an industry during the so called area of ferment 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990). The number of innovations rises until a dominant design emerges and a 
new technology cycle is established. A forth model, developed by Stoelhorst (2002), describes the process 
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by which a radically new technology evolves through different phases into a regime that is subsequently 
only incrementally improved. Stoelhorst further describes competitive rules that apply in each of these 
phases as well as the challenges they pose to management. 
 
Besides contributing to the understanding of the phenomenon of radical innovation, the contribution of 
these models for strategic formulation is limited as their considerations are only descriptive and ex-post. 
 
 Research conducted on the industry level also deduced management implications for organisations to 
successfully cope with discontinuous technologies and radical innovation. One implication for 
organisations challenged by discontinuous technologies is the requirement of flexibility (Utterback, 1994). 
It requires organisations to quickly adapt to new circumstances created by invading technologies. 
Furthermore, organisations need to build up tolerance for failure (Christensen, 1997), often indispensable 
for organisations managing radically new innovation projects. Furthermore, the creation of stand alone 
and autonomous projects teams (Gilbert & Bower, 2002) that combine in-house competencies and 
relations with external agents (McKelvey, 1996) seem to be supportive. Quick decisions and execution is 
critical as first mover advantages coupled with the subsequent build up of sustainable barriers against 
latecomer is crucial with the costly radical innovations (Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Gilbert, 2003). When 
looking for market applications of discontinuous technologies authors recommend to start with small 
radical businesses and to go for customers outside established markets (Gilbert & Bower, 2002). 
Christensen (1997) points out that companies that stick too much to their existing customers unwilling to 
look for customers outside their existing markets are especially vulnerable to  discontinuous technologies. 
 
2.3  Company level research on discontinuous technologies and radical innovations 
Company level research focuses on projects and concentrates on analysing project-related activities in the 
context of discontinuous technology and radical innovation. The community of researchers active in this 
field does not intend to capture observed mechanisms explicitly in models. They rather describe detached 10 
patterns in projects that promote or hinder radical innovation. Veryzer (1998a) for example observed that 
the initiating and driving forces of a radical innovation project play an extraordinary important role in 
advancing the project, and that there is a need for a strong project promoter. Rice et.  Al  (1998) support 
these findings and emphasise the importance of champions for such projects and further advocate a 
separation of the latter from other, more routine business. When it comes to developing and 
commercialising radical innovation Lynn et al (1996) observed that successful companies proceed along a 
probe and learn process. This process describes a market learning rather than market evaluation. It is 
realised by introducing early versions or prototypes of the planned product into the market.  In this sense 
immature products are used as vehicles of learning. 
 
Besides these observations a number of authors developed prescriptive processes (Noori, Munro, Deszca, 
& McWilliams, 1999; Rice, Kelley, Peter, & O'Connor, 2001; Savioz, Lichtenthaler, Birkenmeier, & 
Brodbeck, 2002) designed to mange discontinuous technologies and radical innovation. However all these 
authors fully concentrate on radical innovation and describe the strategy formulation process isolated from 
an overall management context. Hence integration and link to the strategic management process of 
incremental innovation is not explained. 
 
In sum, mechanisms of discontinuous technology change and radical innovation seem to be well described 
on an industry level. However such insights are valuable to understand the phenomenon from a 
macroeconomic perspective, their contribution to strategy formulation and management action is rather 
limited. 
 
Research conducted on the company and project level gives more detailed insight. However, this research 
seems to be less popular and there is no overall strategy formulation process addressing the various 
managerial issues concerning discontinuous technologies and radical innovation in the phase of strategic 11 
decision-making. Furthermore structures supportive to such an overall process have not yet been 
described. 
 
In addition there is one other aspect that most authors seem to neglect: The need for companies to master 
radical innovation as well as incremental innovation in order to be successful in the long as well as the 
short term. Most authors acknowledge this necessity, but none of them describes a strategy formulation 
process supportive to such a simultaneous management of radical and incremental innovation. All authors 
at least analysed in this paper concentrate on describing the mechanisms, challenges and processes related 
to either incremental or radical innovation. But none of these authors explain how their considerations 
would have to be interpreted in an overall innovation management context or process. 
 
2.4  Contribution of this research 
The purpose of the paper is to contribute to step by step closing this gap in literature by developing a 
framework for a practice-oriented process to formulate a technology orientated strategy that suits both the 
management of incremental and radical innovation.  
 
To do this  a case study approach was chosen, which seems to be appropriate reflecting the state of 
research in this field (Yin, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). The guiding question for the cases was to detect how 
established companies strategically plan discontinuous technologies and radical innovation and what the 
specific challenges and problems are connected to this.  Furthermore a better understanding of the state of 
the art in managing discontinuous technology and innovation was sought, where likely consequences of 
this management could be observed and   emerging patterns recognized. Based on a series of in-depth 
interviews management activities that had been carried out were reconstructed in order to transfer 
discontinuous technology into radical innovations, beginning with idea from its birth to the strategic 
decision. In the next chapter  the background of the cases and their design will be described and their 
content reported. A cross-analysis of the cases follows. 12 
3  Evidence from three cases 
The cases have been conducted in technology driven companies from different industries during a ten- 
month research project in 2003. In total 32 interviews with different representatives from each of the three 
companies contributed to the cases. These investigations were part of a major Swiss governmental 
founded research project
11  on nanotechnology. Thus in all analysed cases the companies intended to 
introduce products based on nanotechnology. In one case nanotechnology was used to create a new 
business in the other cases it was intended for existing applications. All companies are leading companies 
in their industry, but they had no previous experience with Nanotechnology.  
 
3.1  Case A: a chemical company 
The first case study was conducted on the corporate level in a global chemical company. This company 
employs about 20,’000 employees. The case analysed the efforts undertaken by the company to introduce 
a discontinuous technological approach for one of its businesses (Fig. 1). This approach was based on 
recent achievements from the field of nanotechnology. It represented for the company a totally new and 
radical solution for UV absorption. First considerations for the nanotechnology approach rose from the 
bottom up, out of one of the company’s divisions in the winter of 2001. This was triggered by the fact that 
nanotechnology represents a potential substitution technology for conventional UV absorber substances 
used in many products of that division. This awareness initiated several technological feasibility studies 
that were conducted within the division. Although the feasibility studies could shed light onto many 
aspects of the nanotechnology approach one major technical problem connected directly with the physical 
characteristics of the nanoparticles could not be solved. By June 2001 the business unit turned to the 
Technology Board with a request for a company wide inquiry aiming to acquire technical support within 
the company. The Technology Board is a consultative body to the CTO on corporate level composed 
mainly of the division’s R&D heads. It used its connections all over the company and started a general call 
for technical support from all divisions. The outcome of this call showed that the problem with the 
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nanoparticles was in general an unsolved problem. All divisions that were active in the field of 
nanotechnology research had encountered the same problems for which the Technology Board had 
requested solutions. 
 
As a result of this unsettling outcome, the CTO as head of the Technology Board took the initiative. In 
October 2001 he informed top management of the situation. In reply, top management demanded the 
Technology Board to clarify the strategic relevance of nanotechnology for the company. One month later, 
in November, the Technology Board presented its findings to top management. It reported that all 
divisions saw a great potential in nanotechnology and that research and development activities in the 
company in this area were generally quite advanced. All divisions had already started projects related to 
Nanotechnology. Nevertheless nanotechnology still represented a fairly unknown field for the company. 
With this information, top management instructed the Technology Board to coordinate a nanotechnology 
monitoring in all the divisions and to secure efforts that would allow the company to follow future 
opportunities triggered by nanotechnology. Besides setting up monitoring activities, the Technology 
Board recommended that the divisions should proceed with their present projects. 
 
In a second phase, which started one year later, in autumn 2002, the Technology Board introduced a 
concept that connected nanotechnology research activities all over the company in order to use synergetic 
effects across the divisions: a knowledge network called competence network for effects based on 
nanomaterials was established. The following goals were defined for the network: (1) Coordinated 
research and knowledge sharing in Nanotechnology research over all divisions, (2) Extension of existing 
competencies in Nanotechnology and build up of core competencies in nanotechnology, (3) Company 
internal and external identification of new approaches in the field of Nanotechnology, (4) Promotion of 
project requests in the field of Nanotechnology. 
 
Insert here: Fig. 1: Chronological course of case A 
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3.2  Case B:  Fragrance Company 
The second case winds up the introduction of a discontinuous technology in a flavour and fragrance 
company employing nearly 6,000 people. This case describes how a company tried to introduce a 
technological approach so far unfamiliar and radical to the industry, based on the latest research from the 
field of Nanotechnology.  
 
The idea to use nanoparticles as a carrier for perfumes was triggered by a researcher in the fragrance 
research division at the end of 1997, which resulted in the first internal tests (Fig. 2). The initiator of the 
idea mainly conducted these tests without official commitment from the department. The tests were not 
very promising at the beginning, but they sufficed to show an initial feasibility. A few months later in 
December 1997, a commercial research laboratory published a presentation on the subject. This confirmed 
the need to continue the so far small and loosely conduced research efforts. 
 
In spring 1998 the research department became involved in the ongoing activities in order to contact the 
research lab about a joint development agreement. The aim of the collaboration was in the first place to 
extend the present research activities without having to apply for its own project from the division’s 
management. The signed cooperation allowed indeed an acceleration of the acquisition of knowledge and 
furthered the feasibility phase with a clearly appreciable financial commitment. The possibility to benefit 
from the knowledge and the resources of the collaborating partner was especially valuable, as the research 
activities within the company had barely been intensified even after this partnership. The commitment 
toward the nanoparticle project had still only low priority. 
 
In the beginning of 1999 the collaboration delivered its first results. They were mainly due to the research 
partner.  The results were estimated to be good enough to apply for status as a project at the division’s 
management level convincing to the perfumers for a fragrance creation project based on the new 
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technology. At that time, there were still no official and consequent activities in the nanoparticle project 
within the company, which was due to a lack of resources and to the still low priority classification of the 
project.  
 
In spring 1999 a product focused research alliance with a major customer of the company operating in the 
field of fabric care conditioning was signed. Through this alliance the nanoparticle project finally 
succeeded in attaining higher priority. As a consequence, the project was soon presented to strategic 
planning committee. By that time strategic planning had no choice other than to agree, as the customer’s 
influence was quite strong. This was the official start of the nanoparticle project and in October 1999 a 
nanotechnology specialist was hired as project manager. 
 
From November 2000 to August 2001 a post-doctoral position at a university was financed by the 
company aiming to visualize the deposition of nanoparticles on textiles. An experimental setup was 
developed and built. But as a consequence of new budget restrictions, this work was stopped just before 
the experimental setup could be systematically operated. 
 
In spring 2002 the research collaboration with the lab was also stopped as the main goals of the projects 
had been achieved and a new level of knowledge did not seem to be emerging. 
 
In 2003 the nanoparticle project was technically finished. The feasibility was proven and the scale up had 
been carried out successfully. Product-specific perfumery work and application was being run. The final 
concept had to be presented to the collaborating customer, but by the end of our case study there was still 
no guarantee from the customer that the benefit from the nanoparticle project was going to be used 
commercially.  
 
Insert here: Fig. 2: Chronological course of case B 
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3.3  Case C: Injection moulding company 
The third case was carried out in a large company with 2200 employees that specialises in injection 
moulding technology. It is positioned with high quality products in different industries. The case analysed 
the introduction of a discontinuous process technology based on research achievements from the domain 
of micro and nanotechnology. Up to this point, injection moulding had never advanced in to micro and 
nanostructures scales. The ultimate goal for the company was to build up a new business in the medical 
market through the application of micro and nanostructures on injection moulded surfaces. Thus a project 
group “Medical” was founded in the beginning of 1994 in one division of the company (Fig. 3). 
 
At the beginning, the Medial group worked mainly on customer projects with conventional injection 
moulding technologies. Very quickly the idea arose to develop a strong business around a specific 
technology that could bring the company a long-term unique selling proposition in the medical market. In 
spring 1994 some of the customer projects started to indicate an increased need for microstructures in 
plastic surfaces. Further customer inquiries confirmed this impression. As a result, the project team 
created a small research sub team to investigate technological aspects, to check the patent situation and to 
clear state of the art literature.  
 
The technology development began with first pilot tests in summer 1994, but very quickly the need for 
more sophisticated equipment required further funding. The project group began to detail market analyses 
in order to present a commercial and technical proof of concept to the executive board. After new means 
were freed with the approval of the executive board in winter 1994 the technology could quickly be 
developed so that it could be presented to potential customers. 
 
In the meantime the technological advances in development narrowed the application range of the 
technology and developed a first strategy for the emerging new business. 
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In spring 1995 first customers were attracted to collaborate in the development of the technology. While 
these collaborations financed the biggest part of development, the customers received their own tailor-
made prototypes. This level of knowledge resulted in the development of a business plan including the 
necessary structures in summer 1995, which was approved by the board of directors in late summer 1995. 
At that time the project group medical was operating on two complementary levels. On the one hand the 
consequent development of the new technology and on the other hand contract projects with conventional 
technologies. Many of the latter projects were acquired thanks to the new research project, which turned 
out to have a fairly good advertising effect and allowed the company to differentiate itself from its 
competitors as an innovator in the industry. 
 
Under these favourable conditions where cash flow was secured through the specific projects with 
conventional technologies, the structures enabling the new business were continuously extended. In the 
meantime the collaborative research development projects with customers allowed the technology to take 
shape for mass production. Some of the customer projects were followed by promising projects for the 
production of single use products.  
 
By the end of 1995 the medical business had grown to an independent unit. But before this process was 
completed it became clear that the turnover calculated in the initial business plans could certainly not be 
achieved. Especially in the new technology based business only a few projects turned into attractive 
orders. Thus the board of directors decided in the third quarter of 1995 to initiate a consulting project in 
order to verify the market position of the new medical business. At the end of 1995 the board of directors 
decided to carry on with it after the consulting company determined that the business was still attractive. 
Until today the technology has never been in mass production. At the end of the case study in October 
2003 only one product based on this process wass under production, which contrary to initial assumptions 
sells only a small number of pieces with low margins. 
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Insert here: Fig. 3: Chronological course of case C 
 
4  Findings  
Analysing and comparing the cases led to the identification of a number of issues related to processes, 
methods and structures (see next paragraph). 
4.1  Process related issues 
Dominant activities not systematised – missing systematic process: The three cases show that none of the 
companies had a systematic strategy formulation process tailored for discontinuous technologies and 
radical innovation. As the uncertainty and risk inherent with project ideas could not be handled by the 
existing NPD processes it took the ideas much longer to be evaluated and mangers said that they did not 
know how to proceed in order to be sure that the ideas had been assessed in the best possible way. Thus all 
the projects were assessed in an ad hoc process. Comparing this process across the three cases four main 
activities turned out to be dominating. These activities were the (1) initiation of the process itself and (2) 
the evaluation, (3) the decision and (4) the realisation of innovation idea. However the activities were not 
defined as such thus it was not clear what their focus was. Furthermore the activities were not arranged 
systematically along a process that provided guidelines in order to efficiently assess the innovation 
opportunity in an aligned way. They were to the contrary, found to be uncoordinated and loosely related.  
 
Difficulties in reliable strategic decision-making - missing evaluations activities on strategic level: 
Analysing the various ad hoc process activities in more detail a critical pattern emerged in all three cases. 
The evaluation of the innovation ideas was carried out almost exclusively on an operational level and 
evaluation on the strategic level was very rare. Thus an innovative idea that triggered the initiation of the 
process, independent from its originating level (strategic or operational), was always assigned to the 
operational level for evaluation. Such evaluations included efforts to prove technical feasibility as well as 
to examine preliminary market expectations. While these analyses were running there was almost no 
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activity that investigated the strategic implications of the innovation idea. Objectives between the strategic 
and the operational level for the evaluation were not given. This made it difficult for managers on the 
strategic level to decide on projects, since all decisions had to be made based on information elaborated 
exclusively from an operational perspective.  
 
Slow process lead times - missing coordination and interrelation between strategic and operational level: 
This observation was generally made in all three cases and concerned most activities we analysed.  Within 
the ad hoc process the various activities from initiation of the process through evaluation, decision and 
implementation, lacked a coordination or interrelation between operational and strategic level for the 
various project activities. Findings that had worked could not be benchmarked with prior set exceptions. 
An iterative and determined course of actions that narrowed the scope of analysis step by step with clear 
strategic goals was not explicitly visible in any of the cases. As a result the analyses conducted in 
operational level projects were executed with a lacking focus. Thus all activities related to radical 
innovation idea analysis turned out to be time consuming and slow.  
 
4.2  Methods related issues. 
Ineffective information processing - missing market and technology intelligence tools: To gain a first 
mover advantage, which is highly beneficial with radical innovation, it is critical to identify an innovation 
opportunity early. None of the companies systematically gathered information in order to catch weak 
technological and market signals leading to radical innovation. Only one company conducted some kind 
of monitoring activities; however these were explicitly designed to follow the continuously evolving 
trends and therefore designed toward incremental innovation.  
 
Once the reception and identification of such signals has succeeded, a company has to filter which ideas to 
analyse in more detail and which ones to eliminate. A first evaluation needs to be quick in order to process 
as many ideas and related information as possible. Furthermore, such a process should guarantee an 20 
acceptable degree of accuracy. In the analysed cases none of the companies applied such a quick 
assessment tool.  
 
Eliminating potential radical innovation ideas by in appropriated evaluation - missing evaluation tools for 
decision management under high uncertainty and risk: The  analysis of the methods used to support 
evaluation and decision making further showed that in all of the three cases, companies did not 
differentiate innovation opportunities with either incremental or discontinuous character. Managers used 
the same set of techniques for both types of innovation. Such methods relied heavily on the idea of 
quantitative assessment, for instance return on investment, net present value, etc. Irrespective of this, the 
adequacy or accuracy of such methods for evaluating breakthrough projects in a very early stage and 
applying the same set of evaluation methods for all innovation projects in a company bears the danger that 
many radical ideas are eliminated too early as a result of being seen as either too uncertain or too risky. A 
possible consequence of applying such evaluation procedures might be that it prevents companies from 
generating and tracking radical innovation ideas. 
 
4.3  Structure related issues 
Emergence of skunk works - missing clear assignments of tasks and responsibility: In none of the cases 
was there a designated person responsible for acting as a key or contact person taking explicit care of 
radical innovation ideas existed. Often such ideas just do not fit into ongoing business activities of a 
company and thus it is not obvious at all who might be assigned to which tasks. This was the case in all 
three projects and as a result it took project ideas much longer to gain attention compared to incremental 
innovation activities. In two cases a consequence was that project evaluations had already been started 
before informing top management. Leifer et al (2000) call such hidden activities skunk work. Although 
skunk work can be sometimes be effective for generating radical innovation (Christensen, 1997) , it is not 
part of a systematic process to promote radical innovation through an organization.  21 
Another issue concerning responsibility was the ownership of the project idea. We observed that 
responsibilities on a strategic level were only assigned once the ideas had been evaluated and the decision 
had been taken that the idea was further investigated in a project. During the period of time where ideas 
did not yet have project status, no responsibilities were assigned. The consequence was that the initiation 
of the evaluation and the drive of the latter were much slower than top management wished it to be in 
general. In addition there was no standardized planning responsible to direct the operational evaluations or 
that formulated and reviewed evaluation deliverables. 
 
Structural conflicts between daily business and radical innovation activities - missing organisational 
alignment: In all three project ideas that we followed from birth until the decision confirming it as an 
official project, hardly any left their organisational home. Most of the activities registered were conducted 
besides the ongoing business in the regular organisation. This caused structural conflicts between the two 
kinds of projects. On the one hand researchers complained that resources that had been granted for radical 
innovation purpose, could not be used as daily business and ongoing innovation had higher priority. On 
the other hand managers, who were under pressure to perform, reported that their daily business suffered 
form radical innovation projects. 
 
The key findings from the cases are summarised table 1.  The analyses follow the categories described in 
this chapter (process, methods and structure related issues). “Non-existent” means that an approach 
towards this issue could not be found, “Partly existent” means that the company already had rudimentary 
approaches or considered this issue implicitly in one way or the other, “Existent” means that this issue was 
explicitly implemented and in use.  
 
Insert here: Table 1  
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5  Requirements to an overall process managing sustainable innovation 
Based on the case studies and literature a number of propositions concerning the design of a strategy 
formulation process that supports sustainable innovation by simultaneously linking radical and 
incremental technological innovation will be developed. Methodological and structural propositions 
follow and are meant to enable and support this process. Therefore in the following section some 
propositions based on theory and practice reported in this paper are elaborated. Whenever possible and 
data available we will connect them with best case practices from various industry examples. Finally we 
outline a draft concept for the management of sustainable innovation – including radical as well as 
incremental innovation (final section of this chapter). 
 
5.1  Process propositions:  
Proposition 1: The design of the process, managing radical and incremental innovation, should be 
structured systematically along the main tasks of strategy formulation: (1) identification, (2) evaluation, 
(3) decision and (4) implementation of innovation project ideas.  
Proposition 2: The action of the process should be continuously extended in order to cover all major tasks 
referring to both, strategic and operational levels. 
Proposition 3: The process should include complementary assignments on the strategic and operational 
level and should be coordinated continuously by the strategic level.  
Proposition 4: The process design should allow a simultaneous but differentiated management of radical 
and incremental innovation ideas according to their level of newness and risk. 
 
In the course of this research a number of companies whose process design today already fulfils at least 
facet wise these propositions were identified, for example the German company Degussa or the Dutch 
DSM group, both active in the chemical industry. Both companies have a process designed for the 
management of radical innovation ideas that covers the main tasks of strategy formulation. It is run in 
parallel to a market oriented innovation processes of incremental project ideas in the business units. The 23 
differentiation of idea evaluation according to different levels of newness and risk for example is realised 
at another company, at IBM. Their innovation project ideas are clustered in three horizons depending on 
the newness and risk they represent for the company. Ideas that are well calculable concerning risk is 
assigned to Horizon one (H1), realisation of this project ideas target extension, and defence of core 
business. Ideas with moderate risk are assigned to Horizon two (H2), these project ideas have scale proven 
business models. Their mission is to increase market share and growth opportunity. Finally high risk and 
uncertain project ideas called emerging business opportunities (EBO) at IBM are regrouped in the Horizon 
three (H3) clusters. This differentiation allows IBM to evaluate later more easily the different types of 
projects with different types of methods (next sub chapter).  
 
5.2  Methodological propositions:  
Proposition 5: Methods should be created to support market and technology intelligence systematically 
during the identification phase.  
Proposition 6: Methods should be created to quickly assess the relative newness and risk of innovation 
ideas for the company. 
Proposition 7: Methods should be designed to evaluate the strategic impact of innovation opportunity 
differently according to their level of newness and risk.  
 
Taking up the case of IBM with its different evaluation horizons, in each cluster different evaluation 
methods are applied. For H1 projects ideas methods to evaluate profit, return on invested capital or costs 
are most important while in H3 project ideas the analysis is rather focused to option valuation, pace of 
conversion form idea to business launch and organisational learning goals. For these projects it is not a 
proven business plan that is important, goals for H3 projects are recorded in a so-called “Learning Plan”.  
The Learning Plan can be considered the strategic counterpart of a business plan. It is a strategic 
instrument that promotes radical innovation projects. 24 
An example for a technology intelligence method used by many established companies is the use of 
corporate venture capital. Corporate Venture Capital is money invested by established companies in order 
to promote small technology start up companies. The motivation of such investments is more strategic 
than financial. It is the motivation to identify small innovative companies developing radical technologies 
that can be of interest for established enterprises. By looking for such companies and financing their 
development established companies have a direct window on these innovative technologies. For example 
the Degussa constantly monitors several hundred technology intensive start up companies in a so-called 
watch list in order to stay a head of technological change.  
 
5.3  Structural propositions 
Generally structures should be designed to enable execution of processes and methods. Additionally 
keeping with the guidelines of the two following propositions is suggested: 
Proposition 8: Structures should be created that provide a contact point and assume responsibility for the 
management of radical innovation ideas. 
Proposition 9: Structures should allow simultaneous and harmonized management of radical innovation 
beside daily business in order to insure organisational alignment. 
 
In the case of Degussa a unit that takes care of radical innovations which is organised as an independent 
company is called Creavis. It represents the contact point for all radical innovation ideas emerging within 
Degussa or discovered outside of it.  
 
Besides monitoring radical technological innovation opportunities for Degussa, Creavis also evaluates 
these opportunities, plans and coordinates their realisation. For the realisation of projects Creavis runs two 
distinct structural approaches: project houses or internal start-ups. A project house is a small innovation 
team where researchers from all business units that are interested in building up competencies with the 
radical technology work together under the supervision and coordination of Creavis. During their time in a 25 
project house researchers are released totally form their daily responsibilities. Project Houses are strictly 
limited to three years. After this period the researcher returns to their business unit taking with them their 
acquired knowledge. Project Houses are set up only if business units have a direct interest in learning 
about the radical technology. If this interest is not established as the radical technology does not seem to 
bring any advantage for given business units for Degussa, Creavis has the possibility to create internal 
start up companies to develop the technology independently. This way whole new business areas can be 
opened up. Once successful the start-up company can be reintegrated into Degussa. 
 
 The Dutch chemical group DSM runs a different approach in realising radical innovation. Instead of 
creating a company of its own a business unit called “Venture and New Business Development” was 
created that is assigned to promote radical innovation. They also dispose of an overall radical innovation 
process in the same way as Creavis. While technology and business intelligence is done independently 
from the market oriented business units as is done at Creavis the two tasks of project idea evaluation and 
realisation is differently approached. Venture and New Business Development virtually buys expertise 
from different business units. This means that researchers stay in their divisional home and work part time 
on radical innovation projects under the supervision of Ventures and New Business Development. Being 
independent from daily business pressure this organisation can take measures in order to create 
organisational alignment between radical innovation projects and daily business projects.  
 
6  A strategy formulation process model for sustainable innovation: 
In this last chapter the findings and propositions are described in an integrated strategy formulation 
process model to transform (discontinuous) technology into radical innovation without neglecting the 
management of incremental innovation (Fig. 4). The purpose of this model is not of a normative nature but 
rather to illustrate how the various elements described in this paper could be intertwined and 
simultaneously managed for the purpose of incremental and radical innovation. 
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Insert here: Fig. 4 
 
On the one hand the model is structured according to strategy formulation and strategy implementation 
and on the other hand at a strategic and operational level. Strategy formulation comprises four process 
phases: information gathering in (1) strategic intelligence, (2) identification of innovation opportunities 
including the decision of assigning the innovation idea one of the two following evaluation phases, (3) the 
two different parallel running evaluation phases and (4) the decision and formulation phase. Within these 
phases the methods described above are located as follows: Venturing activities are placed within strategic 
intelligence. The quick assessment of the relative newness and risk of innovation ideas is done in the 
identification phase in order to decide about the assignment to either one of the following evaluation 
phase. Finally goals expected form the realisation of innovation ideas are recorded in the “decide and 
formulate” by a business plan for competitive strategic
12 projects or in a learning plan for development 
strategic
13 projects.  
 
The implementation on the strategic level consists of redesigning operational processes if this is necessary 
for the realisation of accepted project ideas, controlling- and updating the process. 
 
  On the operational level technology, product and business intelligence processes support strategy 
formulation. They are coordinated from a strategic level. They process information is an iterative way  to 
enable the strategic tasks.  
 
Strategy implementation means at the operational level, the execution of strategic projects through 
technology development, product development and business development. A structural element here is the 
project house in order to develop the technology. 
                                                 
12 Competitive strategic projects aim in the first place to increase short to middle term competitiveness (Tschirky & 
Bucher, 2003) 
13 Development strategic projects aim to implement the more radical change a company has to go through in order to 
secure long term survival (Tschirky & Bucher, 2003) 
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7  Summary and Conclusion 
Poor insight into the strategic management of discontinuous technology and radical innovation 
increasingly represents a strong threat to companies. However most of the research in this field focuses on 
the industry level rather than concentrating on a company level investigating directly radical innovation 
projects. Company level research on radical innovation seems to be less poplar than that at the industry 
level. There is no overall strategy formulation process addressing the various managerial issues 
concerning discontinuous technologies and radical innovation within an integrated context of radical 
innovation and incremental innovation. Three in-depth case studies were conducted, which identified a 
pattern that seems to be at the root of some of the difficulties that companies encounter when faced with 
radical innovation. These insights together with previous research on radical innovation led to the 
development of nine propositions for the design of an idealized strategy formulation process, for 
supportive methods and for enabling structures.  
 
We further transformed these propositions in a visual strategy formulation process model showing how 
the elements described in the propositions could be utilized together. This model shows how radical and 
incremental innovation can be managed simultaneously while differentiating between their different 
natures.  
 
Further research is needed in order to detail the process model, as the number of case studies underlying it 
was limited. Additionally it could be interesting to validate the applicability of the propositions and model. 
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